

CONVENTIONAL FORCES STUDY
FINAL REPORT:


EXPLOITING UNTAPPED POTENTIAL TO
MEET EMERGING CHALLENGES

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
Briefing Outline

- 1) Rising Risks, Untapped Potential
- 2) Purposes, Challenges, Capabilities, Concepts
- 3) Investment
- 4) Presence
- 5) Joint Force Operations
- 6) Recommendations

Main Future Risks



Untapped Potential



Military Purposes

Primary Purposes

1. Deter or defeat attacks on U.S. interests and friends
2. Frustrate lesser and ambiguous threats

Secondary Purposes

3. Remove grave, imminent dangers (WMD)
4. Fill critical roles in contingencies other than war

Design forces for primary purposes; test for secondary purposes.


In View of Purposes, Main Operational Challenges

1. Provide geographic reach, agility, and escalation control to manage low-level coercion and crises
2. Demonstrate ability to respond forcefully
3. Acquire and share knowledge of time, place, conditions, operations
4. Bring fires and forces to bear quickly
5. Gain control of conflict's pace and domains
6. Protect against counterattack
7. Destroy enemy's ability to fight and capacity to threaten again

Operational Challenges Drive Capabilities


SENSE	INFLUENCE	STRIKE	PROTECT	SURGE	CONTROL	PENETRATE	DESTROY	STABILIZE
ISR: Broad Deep Persistent Secure	Survivable Mobile platforms	Long-range Survivable short-range Large-scale PGM	Tiered deployable BMD IO Space control	Rapidly deployable forces Airlift Fast sealift Mobile prepo	Quick- response attack Direct attack Focused MD Diverse littoral forces Assessment	Dispersed Light Lethal Mobile land forces	Precision strike Controlled effects Self-protection Assessment	Security Civil affairs

Concept of Operations: Deter and Defeat Aggression



Concept of Operations: Frustrate Ambiguous Threats

- Adversaries may mount low-grade challenges to avoid war with the U.S.
- Operations must depend on escalation intent
 - A. Escalation: Forces interposed, enemy forces disrupted, counter-pressure applied, forces positioned for decisive response
 - B. Non-escalation: Forces used to apply pressure, stretch enemy resources and resolve
- Capabilities for war should suffice



Military Purposes

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Secondary Purposes

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Test for Secondary Purposes

	NEEDED CAPABILITIES	OVERLAP	SPECIAL NEEDS
Remove grave danger (WMD)	Broad, deep persistent ISR Large-scale long-range precision strike Undetectable platforms SOF	High	High precision from any distance
Contingencies other than war (COTW)	Broad, deep persistent ISR Early/forced entry Control of air, sea, land, space, cyber Escalation Critical target kill	High	Pol-mil specialists

Conventional Forces for Homeland Defense?

- Power projection forces contribute inherently to homeland defense in their strike and deployable BMD roles
- Otherwise, overlap is low
- Use of power projection forces for homeland defense would be counter-strategic signal
- Homeland defense should become a primary mission for the National Guard and Reserve

Key Capabilities Drive Investment Criteria



	SENSE	INFLUENCE	STRIKE	PROTECT	SURGE	CONTROL	PENETRATE	DESTROY	STABILIZE
Criteria	ISR: Broad Deep Persistent Secure	Survivable Mobile platforms	Long-range Survivable short-range Large-scale PGM	Tiered deployable BMD IO Space control	Rapidly deployable forces Airlift Fast sealift Mobile prepo	Quick- response attack Direct attack Focused MD Diverse littoral forces Assessment	Dispersed Light Lethal Mobile land forces	Precision strike Controlled effects Self-protection Assessment	Security Civil affairs

Investment Portfolio

CAPABILITY	HIGHLY-COMPATIBLE		MODERATELY-COMPATIBLE	LESS-COMPATIBLE
	PROCUREMENT	R&D		
Sense	UAV CEC/IT-21 E-2 upgrade Digitization/networking Multi-platform RTIP	Space-based radar Advanced EHF Polar MILSATCOM GPS Microsat research	JSTARS upgrade Maritime reconnaissance	
Influence		UCAV	CVN-77 CVNX	
Protect	DDG-51	UUV/mine warfare BMD		
Strike	B-2 upgrade B-52 upgrade JASSM Miniaturized munitions Precision strike upgrades Tactical Tomahawk	SSGN conversion ALAM SLAM		B-1
Surge	C-17 fleet expansion C-5B upgrade Large a/c countermeasures	Fast sealift concepts Advanced airlift concepts	Tanker upgrade or conversion	C-5A upgrade
Control	JSF Comanche Virginia-class SSN HIMARS ATACMS	Sea Lance/Street Fighter Test ranges	F-22 Apache Longbow F-16 upgrade	DD-21
Penetrate & Destroy	V-22	FCS	155mm howitzer LHD LPD-17 LCAC Abrams upgrade Bradley upgrade	Crusader

Totals

+\$45B
to FYDP

\$35B
in FYDP

-\$10B
from FYDP

Highest Investment Priorities

- Enabling future ground forces
- Long-range and quick-response strike
- ISR, Joint C2, IO
- Space systems
- Lift

From Presence to Saliency

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| Concept | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Forward basing still useful, but least secure where most needed• Demonstrable ability to strike and surge is key to dissuasion and deterrence• Saliency = updated forward presence + staging bases + high-quality access + exercises + engage key allies |
| Implications | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Update forces in Europe and seek allied participation in SWA• Improve access in SWA and East Asia |


Structuring Joint Forces

- Two types of joint capabilities necessary:
 - “Fundamentally” joint capabilities (C2, ISR, missile defense, IO) -- maintained at all times under the CINC
 - “Operationally” joint capabilities provided by services to be integrated and used jointly by the CINC
- CINC has readiness responsibility for the joint force
- All joint units need to be:
 - Ready, rapidly deployable, and employable
 - Tailorable for range of operations
 - Easily integrated and networked
 - Supportable despite distance and dispersion

Tailable Joint Operations


Standing

*Regional joint
force*





Integrated

*Defend ally
against missile
attack*



*Joint, combined
exercise*



Joint Command Responsibilities


Current

- Peacetime activities
- Contingency planning
- Crisis/wartime response

Proposed

- Standing joint force elements --
“fundamentally joint”
- Joint force readiness
- Peacetime activities
- Contingency planning
- Crisis/wartime response


Notional Joint Forces



- Available to any CINC
- Standing joint elements and joint readiness responsibility with key warfighting CINCs

Performance Standards:

Testing New Concepts of Operation Against Emerging Risks




- Joint forces for each region capable of meeting wide range of low-grade challenges
- Joint forces for each region capable of degrade + dominate despite anti-access defenses
- Joint forces for each region + contingency forces capable of degrade + dominate + disarm in largest plausible case

Risk-Cost Scenarios:



RISK

How to Pay for Investment



COST




Increase
spending



Accept
near/mid-
term risk



Reduce least
useful structure
by exploiting
untapped
potential



Recommendations to Tap U.S. Potential: Information Technology

- Require all critical joint C2 systems to be interoperable in 4 years
- Invest in non-technical program to improve ISR and C2 information management
- Support ground forces transformation, especially development and fielding of FCS
- Invest in aviation concepts beyond manned aircraft
- Invest in naval concepts beyond carriers and high-value platforms

Recommendations to Tap U.S. Potential: Integrated Jointness

- Emphasize joint philosophy, operations, problem-solving, and C2 in officer development
- Create capability for joint force planning, C2, and readiness at one or more commands, with availability to *any* theater CINC
- Increase joint exercises under CINCs

Recommendations to Tap U.S. Potential: New Domains

- Develop creative options for IO policy
- Develop policy for use of space to support U.S. operations and deny aggressors

Recommendations to Tap U.S. Potential: Allies

- Offer commitment to update and keep U.S. forces in Europe
- Invite allied contributions to SWA joint force

Risks of Proposed Approach

- Dependence on IT leads to vulnerability to offensive IO
- Information overload
- H.R. policies fail to attract and retain military personnel able to keep up with new force demands
- Enemies resort to large-scale guerilla or urban warfare

Message

1. Risks are rising because of missile and WMD proliferation
2. These risks can be met by unlocking potential
 - IT
 - Integrated joint operations
 - “New domains”
 - Key allies
3. Unlocking potential requires doctrinal change plus investment shift
4. Change permits reduced structure, which can finance investment shift
5. Consistent with non-military information revolution: modest investment + big change = high return